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The preservation of continuity is the only reason for an evi-
dence article this year. None of the decisions in the field had any
substantial significance in the development or the clarification
of the law of evidence.
The decision which came closest to a debatable point was State
v. Solomon.' The trial court had excluded testimony offered by
the defendant to the effect that on the day he was arrested for
violating the South Carolina Blue Laws other merchants in
Charleston were similarly in violation of the statute and were
not prosecuted. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that
this ruling was correct in that the proferred testimony "had no
bearing on defendant's guilt and was irrelevant. One cannot
excuse his unlawful conduct by showing that someone else equally
guilty had not been prosecuted." 2
This broad statement is unquestionably correct, but there have
been cases where a grossly arbitrary pattern of criminal law
enforcement, particularly when based upon racial or religious
differences, has been considered by the courts as a proper foun-
dation for constitutional complaints.3 Indeed, it appears that a
Pennsylvania trial court in 1960 reversed a blue law conviction
upon a showing that the police, because of a shortage of funds
and personnel, enforced the law only against the larger business
concerns. This purposeful discrimination was held to deny equal
protection to the accused.
4
The court in the Solomon case might then have been in some
difficulty on the evidence question if the defendant had been
in a position to make any strong showing of a discriminatory
enforcement policy by the police. He was not, however. The
proferred testimony was taken by the trial court out of the
presence of the jury and showed merely that there were others
* Lecturer-in-Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 245 S.C. 550, 141 S.E.2d 818 (1965).
2. Id. at 574, 141 S.E.2d at 831.
3. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); People v. Harris, 182 Cal.
App.2d 837, 343 P.2d 765 (1960) ; People v. Darcy, 59 Cal.App.2d 342, 139 P.2d
118 (1943).




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
EVIDENCE SuRVErED
in the community who were violating the law without being
arrested. Such a showing could probably be made in every
misdemeanor trial. As Mr. Justice Lewis said, "There was a
total absence of testimony to show an arbitrary and purposeful
discrimination in the administration of the statute necessary
to sustain the claim." 5
B. Parol Evidence Rule
In Profitt 'v. Sitton the court made a normal application of
the parol evidence rule excluding testimony of a real estate
broker as to his interpretation of a written contract between
the plaintiff and the defendant for the sale of a residential sub-
division in respect to whether a water line was to be conveyed.
In Shelley v. Shelley7 the court held that the parol evidence
rule was not violated by the introduction of evidence to explain
a testator's probable intention as to the location of the dividing
line between lands devised to his two sons. There was an
obvious ambiguity in the language of the will, to such an extent
in fact that the line which the master and the trial court had
found (ostensibly without considering "extrinsic evidence") to
be the correct one to separate the "northern part" of the tract
from the "southern part" ran largely north to south rather than
east to west.
0. Hearsay
In State v. Swilling" the accused in a murder case maintained
that the lower court erred in admitting testimony to the effect
that he had been drunk and had been in an altercation with the
deceased on the day preceding the fatal shooting. As his verbal
expressions bore upon his threatening attitude toward the de-
ceased and his drunkenness was part of the whole picture, the
court held the testimony to have been properly admitted. Specific
objection was made to one of these witnesses having quoted him
as saying, "I'm going to get a gun and somebody will be dead
over the weekend." 9 The court held that if this had been merely
a general threat to the peace of the community it would not
5. 245 S.C. 550, 574, 141 S.E.2d 818, 831 (1965).
6. 244 S.C. 206, 136 S.E.2d 257 (1964).
7. 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E2d 851 (1964).
8. 246 S.C. 144, 142 S.E.2d 864 (1965).
9. Id. at 149, 142 S.E.2d at 867.
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have been admissible, but there was other evidence in the record
which would permit the jury to infer that the threat referred
specifically to the deceased.
D. Hypothetical Questions
In Greer v. Greenville County'° the court refused to consider
whether a hypothetical question asked a doctor in a workmen's
compensation case was admissable. The hypothetical question
allegedly assumed facts not in the record and omitted facts in
the record. The court refused to consider the question on the
ground that the question had not been objected to at the hearing.
E. Out of Court Tests
In Williams v. Pendleton Hfg. Co.1 the court held that the
trial judge, in a water pollution case, had properly excluded
testimony offered by the defendant as to the results of a test
of the creek water made approximately a year prior to the
alleged poisoning of the plaintiff's cattle. There must be, the
court said correctly, a showing by the proponent of such evi-
dence that the conditions under which the test was made were
substantially similar to the conditions existing at the time of
the occurrence at issue.
F. Presumption as Evidence
Two decisions by the United States District Court sitting in
South Carolina should be noted. Both opinions were by Judge
Hemphill. In the first of them, Owens v. Durkam Life Ins. Co.,1 2
he correctly applied South Carolina law13 in holding that the
so-called "presumption against suicide" is not evidence to be
weighed by the fact finder against direct proof of suicide. In
the second, SmalZ Business Administration v. Barron,14 South
Carolina law was not involved since the proceeding was one to
enforce subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Small Business
Administration in the course of its investigation of certain
10. 245 S.C. 442, 141 S.E2d 91 (1965).
11. 244 S.C. 228, 136 S.E.2d 291 (1964).
12. 240 F. Supp. 294 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
13. Coleman v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 384, 128 S.E.2d 699
(1962; McMilIan v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 194 S.C. 146, 9 S.E.2d 502
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operations in South Carolina and the issuance of which was
specifically authorized by an act of Congress. One of the re-
spondents was a lawyer and maintained before Judge Hemphill
that the production of his books and those of the small business
concerns which he represented would violate the attorney-client
privilege. The court ordered the enforcement of the subpoenas
against the lawyer, saying that "it is, of course, fundamental to
the proper assertion of the privilege that the material sought
was itself in the original instance privileged material."'I5 The
material sought to be subpoenaed did not embrace any memoranda
of legal advice from the lawyer to his client but consisted merely
of ordinary financial records of the lawyer and the client which
the lawyer happened to have in his possession. If the law were
otherwise, of course, any person could insulate his records from
governmental scrutiny by simply turning them over to his lawyer.
15. Id. at 448.
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